The effects of financial and technical assistance onemployment growth in Bulgaria and Macedonia by Bah, El-hadj & Brada, Josef C.
JCEBI, Vol.1 (2014) No.1, pp. 5 - 17 |   
THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
ON EMPLOYMENT GROWTH IN BULGARIA AND MACEDONIA 
El-hadj Bah, PhD
Josef C. Brada, PhD
Abstract
Using survey data on Bulgarian and Macedonian firms that participated in USAID programs 
providing technical and financial assistance for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
and on firms that did not, we estimate the effectiveness of such assistance in increasing the 
growth of employment in the assisted firms. We control for firm characteristics, as well as for 
the business environment using a difference-in-differences methodology. We find that USAID 
assistance enabled firms in Bulgaria and in Macedonia to increase employment more rapidly, 
than firms that did not receive assistance did. In both countries this effect was evident over a 
two-year period following assistance, and in Macedonia the evidence suggests that the effect 
lasted for longer than this two-year period.  
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Introduction
One of the more troubling aspects of the economic transition in Eastern Europe has been the fact 
that the rapid growth of aggregate output since the early to mid-1990s has been accompanied 
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by stagnant or declining employment, particularly in South East Europe (SEE). This has 
resulted in significant gains in wages, clearly a desirable result, but in some countries, it has 
also resulted in high levels of unemployment or underemployment, creating a phenomenon 
that some observers have called “jobless growth”. The lack of job growth, particularly in the 
SEE countries has contributed to a variety of social and political problems, and dealing with 
them has been a serious policy concern, both in the countries of the region and among foreign 
assistance donors. In this paper, we examine the effectiveness of two sets of programs, those 
administered by USAID in Bulgaria and Macedonia, in creating jobs by providing technical and 
financial assistance to firms in these two countries.  Our findings are based on data drawn from 
surveys of 200 firms in each country, about half of which received USAD assistance and half 
that did not. On the basis of econometric tests, we find that USAID assistance to firms in these 
two countries had both a statistically and an economically significantly positive effect on job 
growth at recipient firms. 
In the next section of the paper, we briefly sketch USAID programs in the two countries, discuss 
issues of program evaluation, as they bear on the design of our sample surveys, and explain 
how firms were selected for sampling and discus the sampling procedure. In Section III, we 
specify and estimate an econometric model that tests for the effectiveness of USAID programs 
using the so-called “difference-in-differences” methodology. The final section provides some 
quantitative estimates of the number of jobs USAID assistance provided in our sample of firms, 
and we conclude with some policy implications and suggestions for future research.  
Evaluating job creation effects
USAID programs in Eastern Europe
In 1989 the United States Congress passed the Support for East European Democracy (SEED) 
Act, also known as Assistance for Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. Like similar assistance 
provided by the European Union (EU) and the governments of other countries, as well as by 
international organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, this assistance was at first 
directed toward creating the institutional infrastructure for the transition to a market economy. 
Thus, programs helped to support the privatization of state-owned firms, to assist counties to 
develop new legal and regulatory frameworks, to make governments more effective, to create 
market-oriented tax codes and budget systems, to support the emergence of sound financial 
institutions, and to open transition economies to the global economy.  
Beginning in the mid-1990s, USAID’s and other donors’ programs in the region increasingly 
came to include programs for the development and expansion of the private sector, with special 
emphasis on small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The emphasis on SME’s was in part 
driven by the fact that such firms were a major source of job creation and dynamism in these 
economies. SME’s were seen as being particularly vulnerable to corruption, to shortcomings 
in contract enforcement and to a lack of access to finance. Moreover, given the lack of 
experience with a market economy and the large structural changes that took place in the 
pattern of production during the transition, managers of SMEs likely lacked both basic business 
skills, as well as technical skills needed to enable their firms to survive and grow in a difficult 
4  For a discussion of this phenomenon and related labor market issues see, Svejnar (2002a, b).
5  See Meyer (1995) for a description of this methodology. 
� USAID, “Work, Economic Growth, and Trade: Economic Policy,” Website location: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/economic_
growth_and_trade/eg/econ_pol.html, accessed on February 2, 2007.
7  For e�ample, Ac�uisiti and Lehmann (1999), Konings et al. (199�) and Konings (1997) e�amined Russia, Poland and Slovenia,                  
Hungary and Romania respectively and found that SMEs were a major source of both gross and net job creation, in most cases in 
an environment where total employment was falling mainly as the result of net job destruction in SOEs. Also see, Haltinwanger 
et al. (200) and OECD (2005) for the role of SMEs in job creation in the later phase of the transition.
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economic environment. Thus, the new USAID programs were targeted toward strengthening 
the capacities at the firm level so as to provide managerial and technical skills to managers 
and their staff and to increase the availability of small credit loans, credit guarantees, and other 
financial support to firms. It is the capacity of these programs to enable firms to increase the 
number of people they employ that is the subject of this paper. 
Data requirements and firm-level surveys
In an ideal environment, the effectiveness of a policy intervention at the firm level could be 
estimated using a random sample of firms, with information covering periods before, after, and 
during the period of policy intervention. If participation in the program is not random, then steps 
should be taken to account for the possibility of selection bias. If a random sample of firms 
is not available, then there should be some effort to control for differences between the firms 
receiving assistance and those not receiving assistance in terms of major firm characteristics 
such as: size, industry, location, etc., and the differences between the two groups of firms 
should be controlled for in the specification of the model. Unfortunately, there was no systematic 
collection of data on firm performance of firms either before or after they participated in USAID 
programs, and this data, as well as data on the performance of firms that did not participate in 
USAID programs had to be obtained ex post through field surveys.8 
The surveys consisted of a questionnaire administered in face-to-face interviews of 20–0 
minutes in Bulgaria or Macedonia respectively. Our surveyors asked for a count of employees 
and not the wage bill, which would be a better measure of the beneficial effects of technical 
and financial assistance, because it was deemed unlikely that a sufficiently large number of 
respondents would be able to recall the history of their wage bill in sufficient detail, and that 
requiring wage-bill information would introduce a bias toward larger and more successful firms. 
We did, however, seek to obtain information on both full-time and part-time employment in order 
to investigate whether part-time employees were cannibalizing the jobs of full-time workers, as 
well as on a number of firm characteristics and respondents’ subjective perceptions of barriers 
to growth.
In each country the surveys were administered by a local market research firm. The objective 
was to obtain a sample of 100 firms that had participated in USAID assistance programs and 
a control group of 100 firms, known not to have received assistance, matched for location and, 
where possible, for business sector. Some of the programs in which firms participated are 
reported in Table 1, which also gives some idea of the different types of assistance provided 
to firms. To identify potential respondent firms that had received USAID assistance, we sought 
out their names in several ways. First, we combed publicly available sources of information 
on USAID activities. This effort yielded only a small number of contacts. Second, we asked 
USAID offices in each country to supply names. Third, we approached USAID contractors and 
implementers, in both their in-country and U.S. offices. Finally, we used data from USAID’s 
TraiNet database. Because some of our contact data were over a decade old, we identified 
about 400 firms that may have received USAID assistance for each country. 
  A shortcoming of such a retrospective approach is that firms that have not survived until the time that the sampling took place 
are not included. If USAID programs had some effect on firm survival rates, this effect cannot be measured. 
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Table . USAID programs with at least three contacts in sample
BULGARIA – 04 contacts
Acronym Program name   Predominant Assistance Type
UM Ustoi Microfinance Financial Assistance
BACB Bulgarian-American Credit Bank Financial Assistance
BAEF Bulgarian-American Enterprise Fund Financial assistance
EGIP Economic Growth and Investment Program Technical assistance
EMED Entrepreneurial Management and Executive Development Program Technical Assistance
FLAG Firm-Level Assistance Group Technical assistance
PSP Private Sector Program Technical Assistance
PTP Participant Training Program Technical Assistance
SEAF Small Enterprises Assistance Fund Financial Assistance
START Strategic Technical Assistance for Results with Training Program Technical Assistance
MACEDONIA – 786 contacts
Acronym Program name  Predominant Assistance Type
EMED Entrepreneurial Management and Executive  Development Program  Technical Assistance
MEF Macedonian Equity Fund Financial Assistance
FORECAST FORECAST Technical Assistance
MER Macedonia Enterprise Restructuring Program Technical Assistance
MPA Macedonian Privatization Assistance Technical Assistance
MAMA / LOL MAMA Program / Seal of Quality / Agribusiness Assistance Program Technical Assistance
MCA Macedonia Competitiveness Activity Technical Assistance
Moznosti 
Makedonija Moznosti Makedonija Financial Assistance
PTP Participant Training Program Technical Assistance
RFI Rural Financial Institutions Program Technical Assistance
SEAF Small Enterprises Assistance Fund Financial Assistance
SME Macedonian SME Fund Financial Assistance
START Strategic Technical Assistance for Results with Training Program Technical Assistance
Source: authors’ compilations
Ideally, these samples would have mirrored the balance of USAID funding for the two main 
types of assistance programs sponsored by USAID: technical assistance to firms and financial 
assistance. In fact, in both countries the number of recipients of financial assistance we were 
able to obtain from contractors and implementers fell short of this. Thus, we included in our 
potential sample every firm that received USAID-program financial assistance in our survey, and 
then we sampled randomly from the remaining contacts. This yielded samples with financial-to-
technical assistance ratios of 15:85 in Bulgaria and 14:86 in Macedonia. Our survey firms, upon 
receiving the sample, analysed it by sector and geographic region and produced a matching 
sample of companies, not known to have received USAID assistance with the same sectoral 
and regional distribution as our test sample.
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The surveys were administered from July to August 200 in both Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
Almost half (8 percent) of contact attempts in Bulgaria led to successful interviews. The 
corresponding figure for Macedonia was 32 percent. Of the remaining attempts, refusals 
made up 1 percent of all attempted interviews in Bulgaria and 1 percent in Macedonia. The 
remainder of non-successful interviews resulted from scheduling problems and vacations ( 
percent in Bulgaria and 13 percent in Macedonia) and bad addresses, bankrupt firms, etc. (29 
percent in Bulgaria, 42 percent in Macedonia). Among firms that could be located, response 
rates were  percent in Bulgaria and 0 percent in Macedonia. Summary statistics for our 
sample show that in Bulgaria 50 percent of firms sampled had received their first USAID 
assistance before or by 2001. In Macedonia, nearly 50 percent of firms had received their first 
aid before or by 2003. 
Before we turn to the results, we should explain why we use the number of jobs created as the 
measure of the effectiveness of USAID performance. Although a count of jobs created is not 
the best measure of the effectiveness of USAID programs, we chose this as the dependent 
variable for two reasons. First, it provides compatibility with other studies of job growth or 
job loss in transition country firms, most of which also use the number of jobs created or 
destroyed as the dependent variable. Our second reason is a practical one. A retrospective 
survey of firms, especially one that covers a period of as much as 10 to 15 years, must rely on 
information that is relatively easy for respondents to provide. Most firms were able to provide 
employment data. Asking firms to provide more complex measures, such as average wages, 
the growing complexity of skills required by the firm, etc., would have reduced response rates, 
introduced biases, and probably yielded “guesstimates” and inaccurate responses.
A difference in differences approach to measuring the effects of assistance 
on job growth
	
An intuitive and widely used model of firm growth in transition economies (Brown et al. 2004, 
Johnson et al. 2000) proposes that firm growth depends on the following broad categories of 
factors:
Firm Characteristics. In our surveys, we obtained information on firm characteristics such as 
age, location, business organization, size, sector of activity, export intensity, etc.
Owner and employee characteristics. We asked about owners’ education, nationality, 
and past experience in business and government, as well as workers’ education and labor 
union participation. We obtained data on part-time employment, as well as on the gender of 
employees. 
Economic environment. Given the large swings in GDP encountered in the course of 
the transition, we used the growth of real GDP as a control for changes in the economic 
environment. 
Business and institutional environment. We used two approaches to measure how 
conducive the regulatory, legal and business environment and institutions in the country were 
to the growth of private enterprise. One was the Index of Economic Reform compiled by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). This index has the advantage of 
being available for the relevant period, of providing sub-indexes for various sectors and reform 
activities such as privatization, market liberalization, etc., and of being comparable across 
countries. Its disadvantages are that the categories indexed are quite broad and the index 
tends to focus on “formal” measures of reform performance. We supplemented the EBRD 
index by asking respondents to rank the importance of various types of barriers to the growth of 
their firms for the years during which their firm existed. We asked them to rate each barrier from 
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zero (no barrier to growth) to two (very serious barrier to growth). The major difference between 
this measure of barriers to growth and the EBRD index is that the former provides a measure 
of the business environment that applies to all firms, while the latter provides a firm-specific 
measure of each firm’s perception of the effect of the environment on its ability to grow. The 
latter approach allows us to ask about specific barriers, such as the effect of grey market firm 
competition, for example. In addition, it reflects not only the existence of barriers, but also their 
importance to local firms and the perceived intensity of the impediment. The disadvantages of 
this approach include the subjective nature of the responses, the need for careful interpretation 
of the results, and difficulty in cross-county comparison of responses. In the event, the firm 
reported barriers to growth proved to be much better at explaining firm growth, than were the 
more general EBRD indicators.
Assistance received by firms. We asked respondents who reported receiving assistance 
to identify the type of aid their firm had received over the life of the firm and the source of 
the assistance. For USAID assistance, we constructed three variables. The first indicates 
whether the firm had received USAID assistance. The second distinguished between technical 
assistance and financial assistance. The third recorded whether the firm received assistance, 
regardless of source or nature, after the initial experience with USAID.9
A comprehensive model based on a longitudinal survey of firms that covers both firms receiving 
USAID assistance, as well as those not receiving it, can be specified as:
gemp i,t = F (Firm characteristics i,t ,Owner and employee  characteristics i,t , 
                   Economic Environment i,t, (or t), Business and institutional 
                   environment i,t (or t), Assistance received by firms i,t )                        Eq. 1
The dependent variable is defined as year-to-year growth in the number of full-time workers in 
firm i in year t, where t is time and i is an index of the 200 firms in each national sample:
gemp i,t = yi, t / yi, t-1                            Eq. 2
where yi, t is the number of full-time workers in year t in firm i. 
We began by testing firm characteristics and relevant responses to the survey questionnaires 
for inclusion in regressions based on Equation 1. In doing so, we discarded variables lacking 
explanatory power and focused our efforts on variables with a clear economic, or policy 
rationale for inclusion in the regression equations. To facilitate the discussion of the results, 
brief definitions of these variables are provided in Table 2. 
Table . Definition of variables
Variable Definition
gemp growth of employment = yt/yt-1, data from 1991 to 200. We exclude the year of establishment or last change of ownership
Firm	and	Owner	Characteristics
size firm size measured by employment
parttime ratio of part-time employees to full time employees in year t
sector sector dummy = 1 for industry and/or services with agriculture as the base 
exports 1 if exports are more than 0% of production, 0 otherwise
9  The number of respondents who received additional assistance after their work with USAID was small enough that it would not 
have been useful to distinguish between different types of “post-USAID” assistance.
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owner_ed 1 if the owner has a higher degree, 0 otherwise
employee_ed 1 if the one or more employees have a higher degree, 0 otherwise
foreign 1 if at least 1 major partner/owner is reported as being a foreigner 
age Number of years of existence of the firm in year t
union 1 if at least 0% of employees are members of a union
Economic	Environment
gdp gdp growth = log(gdp_t)-log(gdp_t-1)
Environmental	Barriers	to	Growth
mgrskill availability of skilled managers  rated from 0 = easy to find managerial skills for the firm to 2 = finding managerial skills very difficult
laborav labor force availability rated from 0 = easy to obtain appropriate labor skills, to 2 = finding workers with appropriate skills very difficult
buspremise obtaining business premises rated from 0 = easy to 2 = very difficult to find business premises
intfin internal finance rated from 0 = could finance firm’s needs internally to 2 = lack of internal finance a serious barrier to growth
extfin external finance rated from 0 = easy to obtain eternal financing to 2 = very difficult to obtain outside financing
inputs business services inputs rated from 0 = easy to obtain business services to 2 = difficult to obtain business services
taxes taxes a burden on growth rated from 0 = taxes not a burden to 2 = taxes are a serious burden
blackkmkt competition from unregistered firms rated from  0 = competition from grey economy not a serious impediment to 2 = grey economy is a very serious impediment
busenv business environment- registration and regulation rated from 0 = not a barrier to firm performance to 2 = serious barrier to firm performance
legaldisp legal disputes rated from 0 = not a serious barrier to firm performance to 2= serious barrier
External	Assistance	to	the	Firm
T =dummy variable = 1 for receiving any USAID assistance
T1 =dummy variable = 1 for receiving non-financial assistance from USAID
T2 =dummy variable for receiving financial assistance from USAID
T3 =dummy variable for receiving USAID or other assistance subsequent to the first     receipt of USAID assistance
A key issue with respect to the specification of Equation 1 is how to measure the duration 
of the effects of USAID assistance and the relative effectiveness of different kinds of USAID 
programs. In order to gauge whether the effect of USAID intervention was mainly short-term or 
lasted for a longer period, we constructed “received assistance” or “T” variables in two different 
ways. To test for long-term effectiveness of assistance, we set a T variable for a firm to zero 
in years prior to its first participation in a USAID program and one for all subsequent years, as 
shown in Figure 1. Firms in the control group have a value of zero for all years. A significantly 
positive value for this variable implies that the annual growth rate of jobs in that firm was, on 
average, higher in the post-participation years than it was in both the firm’s pre-participation 
years and in firms that did not receive USAID assistance. The extent to which this variable is 
able to measure long-term effects must be interpreted in the context of the discussion above 
of the length of our sample and the years in which firms participated in USAID programs. For 
many firms in the sample, the “long-term” may not encompass more than three or four years. 
Bah, E. and Brada, J.
12  | JCEBI, Vol.1 (2014) No.1, pp. 5 - 17   
 
We also tested for short-term effectiveness of USAID programs. In this case, the value of 
T was set equal to one for the two years following USAID assistance and zero for all other 
years, as shown in Figure 2. This two-year effect is a longer time period than the one-year 
effect measured in a number of other studies. A significant coefficient for T in this specification 
indicates that the annual growth of employment in the firm was greater in the two years after 
participating in a USAID program, than it was in other years and in firms that did not receive 
USAID.
The type of USAID assistance was also specified in several different ways. In one case, all USAID 
programs were included in a single T variable. A significant coefficient for this variable signifies that 
any type of USAID program had a significant effect on job growth, either for two years or longer, 
depending on the values of the short-term and long-term variables. We also separated USAID 
programs into two types, those involving non-financial assistance and those that involved financial 
assistance.10 In this case, the specification included two T variables, one set to 1, if the firm       
10 We had originally planned a much finer-grained analysis, but given the relatively small number of programs for which we had
     sufficient detail on the nature of a firm’s participation, the only distinction we could make reliably across programs was “technical 
     assistance” vs. “financial assistance.”
Figure . Long - term effect of assistance
Figure . Short - term effect of assistance
 •  T dummy = 1 for all years after assistance
growth
time
t
t = year of assistance
 •  For 2 years after USAID program, T dummy = 1
growth
time
t
t = year of assistance
t + 2
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received non-financial assistance and the other set to 1, if the firm received financial assistance.          
If the coefficient values for the two aid variables were significant, but differed from each other 
we could conclude that both types of assistance increased job growth, but that one did so more 
than the other, providing a measure of differences in program effectiveness. We also included an 
assistance dummy to capture the effect of subsequent assistance on firm growth.
For each country, the sample consisted of a panel of approximately 200 firms, 100 that we 
had identified as having received USAID assistance and 100 that had not. We used both the 
full sample period, starting from 1991, as well as a reduced sample period, starting in 2000. 
The latter provided more robust parameter estimates in some cases, because much of the 
USAID assistance was received after 2000. The choice of the terminal year depended on 
the availability of exogenous variables.11 A variety of specifications of Equation 1 was used 
to derive our conclusions regarding the effect of USAID programs on firm growth.12 In part, 
this is because there is no a priori expectation that all of the explanatory variables, e.g. firm 
characteristics (location in capital city vs. outlying areas; industry vs. services; unionized or not, 
etc.), should lead to significant differences in firms’ ability to increase employment. Moreover, a 
relatively full set of explanatory variables uses up a large number of degrees of freedom and, 
in part due to multi-colinearity among some explanatory variables, results in high standard 
errors. We experimented with a variety of specifications that utilized subsets of the explanatory 
variables by dropping explanatory variables that seemed the least informative. Some typical 
regression results for Bulgaria are reported in Table 3 for the short-term effect of assistance and 
those for Macedonia for the long-term and short-term effect of assistance are reported in Tables  
and . We do not report results for the long-term effect of assistance in Bulgaria, because the effect 
of assistance in the long-term specification was generally not significant. Coefficients the values of 
which are significantly different from zero at least at the 10% level are marked in bold. 
Table . Sample regression for Bulgaria
(dependent variable: short-term employment growth)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio P>|t|     
T 0.078 0.0895 . 0.05 
mgrskill -0.875 0.8 -.56 0.08
laborav -0.11 0.1 -0.8 0.1 
buspremise 0.021 0.12 0.1 0.82 
inputs 0.00 0.1199 0.9 0.
taxes 0.0341 0.2083 0.1 0.8 
intfin 0.640 0.666 .86 0.006 
extfin -0.996 0.705 -.4 0.05 
blkmkt 0.028 0.112 0.2 0.812 
age -0.096 0.08 -.5 0.040 
size 0.66 0.578 .57 0.07 
parttime -0.7 0.064 -.50 0.00 
constant 0.857 0.675 .0 0.05 
11  In a few cases firms were dropped because of missing data.
12 It is common in studies that seek to find the effect of aid programs, treatments, policy interventions, etc., to employ statistical 
procedures that take into account the fact that the “treated” firms may, as evidenced by the fact that they were selected for 
the treatment, have characteristics that made them better suited to benefit from the treatment. Such a procedure is especially 
appropriate if the sample is a random draw. In our case, however, the sample of non-treated firms was selected to have the same 
characteristics as the treated firms. Moreover, because we use the “differences in differences” method (Meyer, 1995), we also 
test each firm’s performance against itself, not only against untreated firms. 
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Table 4. Sample regression for Macedonia
(dependent variable: long-term growth)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio      P>|t|     
T 0.70 0.0847 .0  0.045 
T3 -0.2118 0.18 -1. 0.1 
age  -0.0074 0.008 -.59 0.00 
owner-ed 0.089 0.080 1.1 0.21 
employee_ed 0.0503 0.0753    0. 0.0 
laborav -0.001 0.0395 -0.13 0.89
buspremise -0.08 0.010 -1.1 0.20 
inputs 0.00 0.0532 0.9 0.344
taxes 0.0563 0.02  1.2 0.213 
intfin 0.021 0.018 0.02 0.1
extfin -0.018 0.08 -0.2 0.9
busenv -0.0967 0.05 -.89 0.060
legaldisp 0.0122 0.0373 0.330  0.
blackmkt -0.0523 0.0361   -1. 0.19
size 0.011 0.0120 1.18 0.238
parttime -0.000 0.0036   -1.12 0.2
industry -0.00 0.07   -.76  0.006
constant .767 0.0897 4. 0.000
Table 5. Sample regression for Macedonia
(dependent variable: short-term growth)
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio P>|t|
T 0.4464 0.68 .97 0.050 
T2 0.3160 0.3641 0.8 0.387
T3 0.3160 0.3641 0.8 0.387
age -0.05 0.04 -.74 0.000 
size -0.97 0.0678 -.76 0.08 
parttime -0.010 0.0112 -0.9 0.346 
services .947 0.45 .80 0.000 
mgrskill 0.07 0.0855 .58 0.0 
busenv 0.013122 0.1753 0.0 0.90 
employee_ed 0.70 0.50 .07 0.00
extfin 0.3641 0.292 1. 0.1
intfin -0.3525 0.22 -1. 0.19
laborav -0.67 0.554 -.7 0.089
inputs -0.567 0.44 -.47 0.05 
taxes -.0011109 .10112 -0.01 0.99
legaldisp -0.1359 0.10 -0.92 0.358
blackmkt -0.4 0.79 -.67 0.000
constant .754 0.49 7.5 0.000
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The results for Bulgaria and Macedonia yield robust and significant conclusions about the 
effectiveness of USAID programs, as well as some additional information about the influence 
of environmental variables and firm and employer characteristics on job growth. Among the 
firm characteristics that were often significant across specifications were firm size and age. 
Also noteworthy was the fact that completion from unregistered firms and grey or black market 
competitors were often mentioned as barriers to firm growth by Macedonian respondents. 
Conclusions regarding the effectiveness of assistance are summarized in Table . 
Table 6. Summary of difference in differences estimates of the effect of USAID 
programs on job growth in Bulgaria and Macedonia
Difference  in differences 
estimate of effect
Significant effect of: Bulgaria Macedonia
Long -term effect of:
   All USAID assistance No Yes
 Technical assistance No Yes
 Financial assistance No No
     Post USAID assistance No No
Short - term effect of:
  All USAID assistance Yes Yes
                          Technical assistance Yes Yes
 Financial assistance No No
     Post USAID assistance No No
In Table 6 we report positive and significant effects of USAID assistance on job growth in 
Bulgaria and Macedonia in the short run and also in Macedonia in the long run. We report “yes” 
in Table , signifying evidence of positive effects of USAID assistance on job growth at recipient 
firms, if the coefficient for the relevant dummy T variable is statistically significant at the 5% 
level. As a partial robustness check, we require that the coefficient for T be significant across 
several different specifications, because there is no theoretical guidance on which explanatory 
variables should be included in the specification. Second, if some subsets of explanatory 
variables yield a significant T coefficient for one country, we require that we find a significant T 
coefficient for some of the same subsets of explanatory variables in the other country, in order 
to report a “yes” for both countries of the identical treatment. That is to say, we require that, in 
order to report “yes” for both countries, there must be identical specifications of Equation 1 that 
yield a significant T coefficient for both countries. We encountered no case where we found 
that specifications in one country that yielded a significant effect for assistance did not yield 
a significant value for T in the other country. In the case of long-run effectiveness, there were 
specifications that yielded a significant coefficient for T for Macedonia, but these specifications 
did not yield a significant coefficient using Bulgarian data. Further, we were not able to obtain 
significant coefficients for T in the long-term model for Bulgaria using other specifications. On 
the other hand, in the case of short-run effectiveness, there were several specifications where 
the T coefficient was significant for both Macedonia and Bulgaria, and thus we report “yes” for 
both countries. 
It is worth remarking that it is not necessary to use identical specifications for both countries 
in order to infer the effectiveness of USAID assistance, but we chose to use this approach 
to impose a higher burden for claiming program efficiency and not simply to try to show 
effectiveness by seeking out one or two specifications for each country that would yield a 
significant T coefficient.
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In the case of Macedonia, the effects of all USAID assistance and of USAID technical assistance 
are significant and positive, both for the two-year horizon and for the longer term, although, of 
course, the length of the longer term varies from firm to firm. The inability to obtain a significant 
coefficient for financial assistance is likely due to the small number of firms in our sample that 
received financial aid. In the case of Bulgaria, the regressions seeking to find a long-term impact 
of USAID program participation on employment growth yielded no significant coefficients for 
the variables indicating participation in USAID programs, but there was a significant increase in 
the growth rate over the two-year horizon for all firms participating in USAID programs, as well 
as for firms participating in technical assistance. Part of the reason for our inability to obtain 
significant long-term effects for USAID programs in Bulgaria, and as well as for assistance 
offered by other aid donors may well be due to the large proportion of the firms in our sample 
that received assistance late in the sample period. 
Economic implications and conclusions
Beyond statistical significance, what is more important for program evaluation is the magnitude 
of the effect of USAID assistance on job growth.	This can be approximated by comparing the 
value of the coefficient for T relative to the value of the dependent variable in the difference in 
differences method.  The mean value of employment growth in our sample of both treated and 
untreated firms over the sample period was about 9% for Bulgaria and 13% for Macedonia. The 
value of the coefficient for the short-term T dummy in Bulgaria is about 0.07 in the difference 
in differences estimations. This means that job growth in Bulgarian firms that received USAID 
assistance was about double that of the entire sample for the two years following the receipt 
of USAID assistance. In the case of Macedonia, the growth effects of USAID programs were 
even stronger.	First, they were found to be significant for the two-year period, as well as for 
the longer period, where we seek above-average growth for all years subsequent to the firm’s 
participation in a USAID program. Second, the absolute value of the T coefficients was greater 
in the case of Macedonia than in Bulgaria. The mean job-growth for our sample was about 1.13 
and the T coefficients ranged in value from 0.12 to 0.20 across a range of specifications for the 
difference-in-differences estimates. Thus, Macedonian firms that received USAID assistance 
grew at a rate roughly equal to 13 + (12 to 20) = 25 to 33% per year. The Macedonian firms that 
received USAID assistance had average employment of slightly over 0 workers, and so they 
employed about ,100 workers. The faster growth thus created 90 to 1100 additional jobs in 
the first year and even more additional jobs in the second year following the receipt of USAID 
assistance. This represents a major positive effect on employment at these firms, and it is clear 
evidence that the	assistance that these firms received did have a major impact on their ability 
to create new jobs.
We close this discussion with two caveats. First, there is the possibility that these estimates 
of the positive effects of USAID programs may be biased upwards, because our sample 
was limited to firms that were still in existence in 2007. Firms that went out of business after 
participating in USAID programs were not included in the sample, limiting us to measuring 
growth at “successful” firms. Second, in our specifications, we treat all USAID programs as being 
the same, other than the distinction we make between financial and non-financial assistance. 
Thus, differences in the design, implementation and effectiveness of USAID programs across 
countries may be responsible for some of the evident differences in outcomes across countries. 
While we have used a broad categorization of USAID programs, clearly within each category 
there are different contractors and program designs. A more extensive review of these programs 
might reveal differences in program design that explain some of the difference in cross-country 
performance of assistance programs revealed by our study. 
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